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Abstract: A major issue in the widespread controversy about the legality of poker and 
the appropriate taxation of winnings is whether poker should be considered a game of 
skill or a game of chance. To inform this debate we present an analysis into the role of 
skill in the performance of online poker players, using a large database with hundreds 
of millions of player-hand observations from real money ring games at three different 
stakes levels. We find that players whose earlier profitability was in the top (bottom) 
deciles perform better (worse) and are substantially more likely to end up in the top 
(bottom) performance deciles of the following time period. Regression analyses of 
performance on historical performance and other skill-related proxies provide further 
evidence for persistence and predictability. Simulations point out that skill dominates 
chance when performance is measured over 1,500 or more hands of play. 
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[2] 
Poker is the most popular card game in the world. Every day, hundreds of thousands of people play 
poker for real money on the Internet (Online Poker Traffic Reports). In 2013, online poker rooms 
generated approximately  ? ? ? ?billion in gross win (H2 Gambling Capital). The popularity of the game 
is also evidenced by the many TV reports of major poker tournaments and the number of 
participants in these tournaments. In 2014, for example, 6,683 people paid $10,000 to participate in 
the most renowned poker tournament, the Main Event of the World Series of Poker in Las Vegas. 
At the same time, there is a widespread controversy about the legality of poker and the appropriate 
taxation of winnings. A key issue in the debate is whether poker is to be considered a game of chance 
or a game of skill. Unlike with games of skill, organizing or playing a game of chance is prohibited or 
restricted in many countries. Also, many countries have a separate gam(bl)ing tax for games of 
chance, while money won in a game of skill is generally subject to regular income tax. Kelly, Dhar and 
Verbiest (2007) map legislation and case law on poker for various countries, and show that there is 
great variation. US regulation even differs across states. Over recent years, several law papers have 
argued that poker is a skill game and should be recognized as such (Cabot and Hannum, 2005; 
Grohman, 2006; Tselnik, 2007). 
Authorities often have a less permissive stance towards online poker than towards live poker. In the 
US, for example, the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA) that was adopted in 2006 
had a major impact: although the act did not forbid online gambling, it did prohibit the transfer of 
funds to and from online gambling businesses. As depositing money is necessary for playing online 
poker, this act effectively declared online poker illegal. If poker were to be considered as a skill game 
and not as gambling, this could be an argument to exempt the online poker business from the UIGEA 
(Tselnik, 2007). 
Two different research tracks have examined the skill component in poker. One track focuses on 
developing and calculating measures of skill, and can be traced back to Kadane (1986). Borm and van 
der Genugten (2001), Dreef, Borm and van der Genugten (2003, 2004a, 2004b), and Hendrickx et al. 
(2008) propose measures that compare the performances of different types of players, including an 
informed hypothetical player who knows exactly the cards that will be drawn. The use of their 
approach is, however, limited to relatively simple games. Because of the virtually infinite number of 
possible game situations that result from the many different choice (betting) options that players 
have and because of the imporƚĂŶĐĞŽĨƉůĂǇĞƌƐ ?ŚŝĚĚĞŶŚŝŐŚĞƌ-order beliefs, the approach cannot be 
accurately implemented for the most popular form of poker, EŽ>ŝŵŝƚdĞǆĂƐ,ŽůĚ ?Ğŵ ? Nevertheless, 
even for simple poker variants, the different studies report a substantial degree of skill. Heubeck 
(2008) reviews the various kinds of proposed skill measures. 
[3] 
The second track of studies takes a more empirically oriented approach. Likewise, these papers 
suggest that poker involves a skill component. Larkey et al. (1997) and Cabot and Hannum (2005) ran 
large-scale simulations with different pre-defined playing strategies and find that their more 
sophisticated strategies perform better. DeDonno and Detterman (2008) carried out experiments 
with student-subjects and demonstrate that the group of players who received strategic instructions 
during the session outperformed the control group. Siler (2010) analyzes online poker data and 
establishes that performance is related to playing style, and that style and performance differences 
between players decrease with the level of the stakes. 
In the same spirit as some of the analyses in the present paper, Croson, Fishman and Pope (2008) 
and Levitt and Miles (2014) examine whether there is persistence in the performance of poker 
players. Croson, Fishman and Pope analyze how well players who have finished in the top 18 of a 
high-stakes tournament fare when they are among the final 18 players in a subsequent major 
tournament, and they compare their results with those from a similar analysis for professional golf. 
They find that previous finishes predict current finishes, and that the skill differences across the 
poker players in their sample are similar to those across the golfers. Levitt and Miles analyze a data 
set that comprises the complete rankings of all players who entered a 2010 World Series of Poker 
tournament. They report that players who were a priori classified as being especially skilled indeed 
outperformed the other players. 
In what follows, we analyze the role of skill in the performance of online poker players, using a large 
database with 456 million player-hand observations from real money ring games at three different 
stakes levels. Online poker seems to be the most obvious data source, because the chance-skill 
debate is especially oriented towards issues regarding the legality of internet poker and the taxation 
of winnings from online play. Moreover, the vast amount of data that are available allow for 
powerful analyses. 
tĞĚĞĨŝŶĞƐŬŝůůĂƐĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚĂĨĨĞĐƚƐĂƉůĂǇĞƌ ?ƐƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞŽƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ chance. In a pure game of 
chance, ĞĂĐŚ ƉůĂǇĞƌ ?Ɛ ĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚ ǁŝŶŶŝŶŐƐ ĂƌĞ ǌĞƌŽ  ?ŝŶ ĂďƐĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ĐŽƐƚƐ ? ĂŶĚthere normally is no 
persistence or positive autocorrelation in their performance: ƉůĂǇĞƌƐ ?performance over a given 
period is independent of that over any other period (in absence of budget constraints; explained 
later). If performance is predictable, the game involves elements of skill. 
Our results indicate that skill is an important factor. When we split our sample into subperiods, we 
find that players whose performance was in the top (bottom) deciles of the previous period perform 
better (worse) and are more likely to end up in the top (bottom) deciles of the current period. 
[4] 
Regression analyses of performance on past performance and other skill proxies reinforce this 
evidence of persistence in performance. 
From a legal viewpoint, the key question is whether skill dominates chance, that is, whether poker is 
more a game of skill than a game of chance. The answer to this question heavily depends on the 
duration and intensity of play, as the effect of chance diminishes with the number of hands and 
eventually cancels out in the long run.1 Our simulations point out that skill predominates after 
approximately 1,500 hands. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section I discusses our data and presents descriptive statistics, 
Section II analyzes the persistence of performance using decile analyses, Section III reports on our 
regression analyses, Section IV presents our simulations, and Section IV concludes. 
 
I. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
For our analyses we use data on real money ring games  ? “ĐĂƐŚŐĂŵĞƐ ? ?played at one of the major 
online poker sites. We consider No Limit (NL) dĞǆĂƐ,ŽůĚ ?ĞŵŽŶůǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞthis variant is by far the 
most popular form of poker worldwide. Our data come from an online service called HHDealer. In 
recent years, several companies have specialized in gathering and trading so-called  “hand histories ? 
from online poker rooms. With software applications they continuously collect information on hands 
played at online poker tables. Many players buy these data to have information on the playing styles 
of others. Because of limited resources, hand history providers are unable to store data on every 
hand that is played online. Out of the websites that responded to our inquiries, HHDealer was able to 
provide the largest number of hands for an uninterrupted period of twelve months. We purchased all 
available data for the games that had been played at three particular stakes levels in the period 
October 2009  September 2010.2 In poker, stakes levels are distinguished by the size of the small 
and the big blind bet. To ground our analysis on distinct stakes levels, we selected data from so-
called  “low ?,  “medium ? and  “high stakes ? games, with big blind sizes of $0.25, $2 and $10, 
respectively. 
                                                          
1
  “ŚĂŶĚ ?ŝƐƚŚĞŐĂŵĞƚŚĂƚŝƐƉůĂǇĞĚďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚǁŽƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚƐŚƵĨĨůĞƐŽĨƚŚĞĚĞĐŬ PĚĞĂůŝŶŐŽĨĐĂƌĚƐ ?ďĞƚƚŝŶŐ ?
and awarding of the pot (in another context, the term can also refer to the cards dealt to a player). With 
 “ƉůĂǇŝŶŐ Ă ŚĂŶĚ ? ǁĞ ŵĞĂŶ ƚŽ ďĞ ĚĞĂůƚ ŝŶ ? tŚĞŶĞǀĞƌ ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ? ǁĞ ĂǀŽŝĚ ƚŚĞ ƵƐĞ ŽĨ ƉŽŬĞƌ ƚĞƌŵŝŶŽůŽŐǇ ? tĞ
believe that reading this paper does not require the reader to understand the game. 
2
 For the middle stakes level, the data that we received also contained hands played in September 2009. We 
treat these as if they were played in October 2009. 
[5] 
The resulting raw data set contains a total of 76.9 million different hands. The average number of 
players participating in a hand is 5.9, yielding 456.1 million different player-hand observations. Of 
these, 190.6 million (41.8%) are from the low stakes games, 229.1 million (50.2%) are from the 
medium stakes, and 36.4 million (8.0%) are from the high stakes. The smallest number of 
observations recorded in a month was in February 2010 (17.3 million, or 3.8%), and relates to a 
software change that temporarily made data mining more difficult. The peak was in January 2010 
(57.9 million, or 12.7%). 
Table 1 summarizes the data. Our sample contains over 600,000 different players.3 About 457,000 of 
them played at least one hand at our low stakes level ($0.25 big blind), 230,000 played in the 
medium stakes game ($2 big blind) and 34,000 played in the high stakes game ($10 big blind). They 
rarely switched between these three levels: nearly all hands (96%) were played at the stakes level at 
which the player played most frequently. A minority of players (17%) were active at more than one 
of the three levels, but even these players still played 90 percent of their hands at their most favorite 
level. 
[ Please insert Table 1 about here ] 
Players who participated in the high stakes game played on average 1,085 hands at that particular 
level. For the medium and small stakes this number is 996 and 417, respectively. The average 
number of hands played at the three levels combined is 746. There is much variation across players 
in the number of hands that they played at the stakes we have selected. One exceptional player was 
involved in approximately 765,000 hands (0.17% of our sample), while 58.9 percent of all players 
participated in less than one hundred hands. The degree of concentration is high: the one percent 
most active players played 58.5 percent of all hands, and 12.0 percent played 90 percent.4 
Table 1 also shows statistics ŽŶƉůĂǇĞƌƐ ?ǁŝŶŶŝŶŐƐ, both before and after ƚŚĞĚĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ “ƌĂŬĞ ? ?ƚŚe 
commission taken by the operator). To compare and combine performance statistics across stakes 
levels, winnings are scaled by the size of the big blind. For example, a profit of 5 big blinds 
corresponds to a profit of $50 at the high stakes, and $1.25 at the low stakes. To also account for 
differences in the number of hands played, performance is expressed as the number of big blinds 
won per 100 hands (bb/100). For example, a player who has won $20 at a big blind of $2 after 
playing 400 hands has realized a performance of 2.5 bb/100. 
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 We interpret each account as a separate player. People are not allowed to have multiple accounts. 
4
 Most likely, many of the infrequent players were active at other stakes levels than the three included here. 
[6] 
On average, players lost 104 bb/100 after charging of rake. This average win rate is much worse than 
the ratio of the average total number of big blinds lost (49) and hands played (746), or 6.6 bb/100. 
The difference is explaiŶĞĚďǇĂƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶĂƉůĂǇĞƌ ?ƐƉƌŽĨŝƚĂďŝůŝƚǇĂŶĚƚŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨ
hands that she played. This relation may reflect the effect of experience, but can also be a 
consequence of budget constraints becoming an obstacle after losses. 
Rake substantialůǇĂĨĨĞĐƚƐƉůĂǇĞƌƐ ?ǁŝŶŶŝŶŐƐ ?/ĨĂŚĂŶĚŝƐŶŽƚĨŝŶŝƐŚĞĚŝŶ ƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚďĞƚƚŝŶŐƌŽƵŶĚ ? “ƉƌĞ-
ĨůŽƉ ? ? ?ƚŚĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŽƌƚĂŬĞƐĂĨŝǆĞĚƉĞƌĐĞŶƚĂŐĞ ? ?A?ĨŽƌŽƵƌĚĂƚĂ ?ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƉŽƚǁŝƚŚĂĨŝǆĞĚŶŽŵŝŶĂůĐĂƉ
that depends on the number of players at the table. Only 32 percent of all players in our sample 
achieved a positive overall result after the deduction of rake. In reality, this percentage is slightly 
higher: players can easily participate in reward schemes and receive deposit bonuses that partly 
make up for it, and they can enter into so-ĐĂůůĞĚ “ƌĂŬĞďĂĐŬĚĞĂůƐ ?with affiliates of the operator. 
For our analyses of the role of skill in performance we correct for rake, because we do not want our 
findings to be conditional on the rake structure that is employed by the operator. Rake is not an 
intrinsic element of the game, and the percentages and caps differ across sites. Moreover, as 
explained above, the amount of rake that a player effectively pays is not observable. 
To correct players ? winnings for rake, we add back the rake in proportion to their contributions to the 
pot. KŶĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ ?ƌĂŬĞƌĞĚƵĐĞƐƉůĂǇĞƌƐ ?ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞďǇ16 bb/100 in our sample. As a result of the 
fixed nominal cap, the effect of rake on players ? win rates is larger for games with smaller stakes. In 
the absence of rake, 37.5 percent of all players would have made a profit. The extreme values for the 
best and worst win rate in the table were recorded for lucky and unlucky players who played only 
one or two hands. 
 
II. Decile Analyses 
Under the null hypothesis that poker is a game of chance alone, there is no relation between a 
ƉůĂǇĞƌ ?Ɛperformance scores across different subperiods. Alternatively, if skill plays a material role in 
the game of poker, we would expect a player ?s performance in one particular subperiod to be 
indicative of her performance in later subperiods. In this section we subdivide players into deciles 
based on their performance in the first six months of our sample period and examine how the 
players in these deciles fared in the last six months. In the next section we look at the persistence 
and predictability of performance through regression analysis. 
Our sample period covers twelve consecutive months. We split up our data into the subsamples 
October 2009  March 2010 and April  September 2010, and rank the different players into deciles 
[7] 
according to the average number of big blinds they have won per hand across the first period (the 
 “ƌĂŶŬŝŶŐ ?ƉĞƌŝŽĚ ?. Because small collections of hands are likely to yield very noisy indicators, we filter 
out players who have played less than 1,000 hands during this ranking period. This leaves a sample of 
17,257 players for the small stakes, 16,435 for the medium stakes, and 2,725 for the high stakes. A 
total of 36,570 players participated in 1,000 or more hands at the three levels combined. On average, 
they played 5,706 hands each (median: 2,245). Next, we examine the average performance of the 
various deciles of players over the second period of six months  ?ƚŚĞ  “ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞŵĞŶƚ ? ƉĞƌŝŽĚ ?. To 
prevent selection effects, we impose no restriction on the number of hands in this measurement 
period. As explained in the previous section, hand outcomes are corrected for rake and scaled by the 
size of the big blind. 
Table 2 shows the results for the three individual stakes levels (Panel A, B and C) and for the three 
levels combined (Panel D). The left part of the table includes the average performance (in bb/100) for 
each decile over the ranking period (Period 1), while the right part displays how well each decile 
fared in the measurement period (Period 2).5 In a nutshell, the results indicate that there is 
substantial and significant persistence in performance: deciles of players that performed relatively 
well in the first period on average continued to do so in the second period. The findings for individual 
stakes levels are generally similar to those for the three levels combined, and our discussion below 
therefore mainly concentrates on the aggregated sample. 
[ Please insert Table 2 about here ] 
We first discuss the results where measurement-period decile performance is calculated as the 
unweighted average performance across players. In general, players from higher-ranked deciles 
outperform players from lower-ranked deciles. For example, the average player from the top decile 
for the three stakes levels combined lost 23.0 bb/100, while the average player from the bottom 
decile lost 42.5 bb/100; the difference of 19.5 bb/100 is statistically significant (t = 3.12; p = 0.002). 
Across all deciles, the Spearman rank correlation between the average decile performances in the 
ranking period and those in the measurement period is marginally significant (ʌ = 0.600; p = 0.073). 
At the individual stakes levels, the correlation coefficient is not significantly different from zero for 
the small stakes, and marginally significant for both the medium and the high stakes. 
                                                          
5
 Note that the deciles comprise less players in the measurement period than in the ranking period. Players 
either ceased to play at some point, moved up or down in stakes, or were simply not covered in our hand 
histories. For the three stakes levels combined, out of the 36,570 players who played at least 1,000 hands 
during the first six months, a subgroup of 20,632 were also active during the subsequent six months. On 
average, the players in this subgroup played 7,038 hands in the first period (median: 2,526) and 4,814 (median: 
717) in the second. 
[8] 
The unweighted average in period two is negative for all ten deciles. This result is related to the 
equal weight assigned to every player in calculating decile performance. There is much variation 
across players in the number of hands they played in Period 2; this number ranges from 1 to 622,936. 
Because a budget constraint can force a player to stop playing when losses accumulate, a negative 
average result from a bad sequence of hands is less likely to be cancelled out or diluted by 
subsequent hands than a positive result after a streak of luck. Consequently, at the player level, 
negative average performances are more likely to occur than positive average performances. Indeed, 
players who played relatively few hands in Period 2 have lower scores: those who played less than 
100 hands (18.9% of all active players) recorded a score of -79.9 bb/100, while the others (81.1%) 
recorded -4.6 bb/100 on average. 
The substantial share of players who played relatively few hands in the measurement period may 
also explain why the decile-level correlation between the average performances in the ranking and 
measurement period is only marginally significant. Performance measurements for infrequent 
players are relatively noisy, and their widely varying scores consequently distort the strength of the 
correlation. In fact, players who played only a few hands are given a questionably large weight when 
decile performance is expressed as a straight average across players. Using a weighted average with 
ƉůĂǇĞƌƐ ? ŶƵŵďĞƌ ŽĨ ŚĂŶĚƐas weights would avoid this problem, and we therefore propose this 
measure as an alternative indicator. This weighted average is identical to the average profitability per 
hand across all hands played by the players in a decile combined. Because players who played only 
infrequently are hardly reflected in this alternative measure, we also consider a compromise 
weighting method that uses ƚŚĞƐƋƵĂƌĞƌŽŽƚƐŽĨƉůĂǇĞƌƐ ?ŶƵŵďĞƌs of hands as weights. 
Evaluating on the basis of the two weighted average performance measures strengthens the pattern 
observed. Players from higher-ranked deciles again outperform players from lower-ranked deciles in 
Period 2. For example, hands played by players in the top decile yielded a profit of 5.1 bb/100 across 
all stakes levels, while hands played by bottom decile players lead to a loss of 5.9 bb/100 (difference: 
11.0 bb/100; t = 12.36; p < 0.001). The Spearman rank correlations across the deciles between 
performances in the two periods are higher with weighted than with unweighted average scores and 
always statistically significant  both for the three individual stakes levels and for the three levels 
combined (for all stakes and weightings: ʌ A? 0.733, p A? 0.021). Note that the measurement-period 
performance is positive for most deciles when ƉůĂǇĞƌƐ ?ŶƵŵďĞƌs of hands are used as weights. This is 
striking, because, by definition, the average winnings per hand are zero across all hands in our 
unfiltered sample. Apparently, players who played 1,000 or more hands in the prior six months (and 
thus satisfied our selection criterion) played more profitably than others. This, in itself, might indicate 
that experience pays off in this game. 
[9] 
The persistence of performance also appears from how players in a given decile rank relative to all 
other players in Period 2. The last column of Table 2 shows that players from higher-ranked deciles 
generally rank higher than players from lower-ranked deciles do. For example, for all stakes levels 
combined, the average rank of top-decile players is 10,135 (out of 20,632), while that of bottom-
decile players is 12,098. 
At the individual player level, the strength of the correlation between ƉůĂǇĞƌƐ ?Period 1 and Period 2 
ranks is rather moderate. The correlation coefficient ranges between 0.074 (for the small stakes) and 
0.104 (for the medium stakes). The relatively low degree of correlation as compared to the 
correlation coefficients at the decile level reflects the relevance of variance in performance at the 
individual level  W in particular of the variance for players who played only few hands in Period 2. 
Statistically, however, the rank correlation at the individual player level is highly significant for every 
(sub)sample (all p < 0.001). 
As a robustness check, we have also run similar analyses that use three instead of six months as the 
ranking and measurement period, where we divided our one-year sample period into four non-
overlapping quarters (Q1 = October  December 2009, Q2 = January  March 2010, Q3 = April  June 
2010, and Q4 = July  September 2010). Regardless of the pair of successive quarters that we use for 
ranking and measuring, we observe the same pattern of persistence as before: higher-ranked deciles 
generally outperform lower-ranked deciles. Again, the correlations are stronger when we reduce the 
influence of relatively infrequent players by calculating performance as a weighted average, and at 
the individual player level the rank correlation is always highly significant. 
Thus far we have ranked players on the basis of their average performance in big blinds. Though 
simple and natural, this approach ignores the importance of differences between players in the 
number of hands that they played. Few would share the view that a player who has won 500 big 
blinds over 1,000 hands (50 bb/100) is to be considered a better performing player than someone 
who has won 40,000 big blinds over 100,000 hands (40 bb/100). One of the drawbacks of the 
previous approach is that it does not account for the basic statistical rule that the sampling 
distribution of the mean depends on the sample size (ni): the greater the number of observations, 
the less likely that the mean takes an extreme value. For example, if we consider two players with 
equal ability from a larger population, the player who participates in a smaller number of hands is 
more likely to be classified in one of the top or bottom deciles if players are ranked by their average 
winnings per hand. Similarly, the previous approach does not account for differences in playing style 
or the standard deviation of winnings (si): when two players are equally profitable, the more 
adventurous player is more likely to end up in one of the two extremes of the ranking. 
[10] 
We therefore propose an alternative measure to rank players that accounts for the number of hands 
and playing style of an individual player (i): 
(1) 
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ii
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n/BB
ratewinstdev
ratewin
PRM     
where BBi is the sum of big blinds won (before deduction of rake), si is the standard deviation of big 
blinds won, and ni is the number of hands played. tĞ ůĂďĞů ƚŚŝƐ ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ ƚŚĞ  “ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ
ƌŽďƵƐƚŶĞƐƐ ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ ?  ?WZD ? ? /Ŷ ĨĂĐƚ ?PRMi equals the t-value of a test of Ă ƉůĂǇĞƌ ?Ɛobserved 
performance against the null-hypothesis of zero expected performance. 
Table 3 presents the new results. Accounting for playing style and number of hands in the ranking 
period strengthens the previous evidence for performance persistence. Deciles of players who rank 
higher by their PRMi generally fare better than lower-ranked deciles. The new ranking method turns 
out to be more accurate: in many cases, the performance of a decile in Period 2 is now perfectly or 
almost perfectly monotonically increasing with the rank of a decile for Period 1. For example, for the 
aggregate data, the rank correlation is perfect when Period 2 decile performance is measured with 
players ? numbers of hands as weights. For each stakes level, the rank correlation of performance at 
the individual player level is stronger as well. The new coefficients are about two to four percentage 
points larger, and range between 0.091 (small stakes) and 0.148 (medium stakes). Additional 
analyses with three-month periods yielded similar results. 
[ Please insert Table 3 about here ] 
Another way to look at the persistence of performance is through transition probabilities. Table 4 
shows transition probabilities across performance deciles for players who played 1,000 hands or 
more over the first six months of our sample period. These players are ranked on the basis of their 
performance twice: for Period 1 and for Period 2. The probabilities in the table indicate the empirical 
probability of transitioning from a given decile in the first half-year period to a given decile in the 
second half-year period. Players for whom we have no observations for the second period are not 
included in the ranking for the second period, so essentially the probabilities are conditional on 
participation in the second six months. 
In Panel A, the performance measure that is used to rank players is the standard performance 
measure (bb/100) after correction for rake. The fraction of players in the top decile of Period 1 who 
end up in the top decile in Period 2 is 13.6 percent; players who are in the worst decile end up in the 
worst decile 19.6 percent of the time. These empirical probabilities are substantially greater than the 
value of 10 percent that would be expected under the null hypothesis of no performance persistence 
[11] 
(all p < 0.001). At the same time, however, there is some evidence that the likelihood of ending up at 
the opposite extreme is also greater than 10 percent. For example, the chance of transitioning from 
the very best (worst) category to the very worst (best) is 12.3 (11.2) percent. This pattern is 
symptomatic of the inadequacy of the ranking measure used here: players with a higher variance of 
their average winnings due to adventurous or infrequent play are more likely to end up in the 
extreme win rate categories. Ranking players on the basis of our alternative performance robustness 
measure controls for this variance effect. 
In Panel B, players are ranked on the basis of their PRMi.
6 The results are compelling: players from 
the top decile reappear in this decile 20.7 percent of the time, and with a probability of 5.4 percent 
they end up in the bottom decile relatively infrequently. Similarly, losers are unlikely to become 
winners: the worst ten percent rank among the best ten percent in the next six months only 5.2 
percent of the time and among the worst ten percent 18.5 percent of the time. The empirical 
probabilities are even more telling when we look at percentiles (not tabulated): the very best one 
percent of players in Period 1 rank among the very best one percent in Period 2 11.4 percent of the 
time, and among the best ten percent 32.8 percent of the time (11.4 and 3.3 times the base rate). 
They are among the worst ten percent only 3.4 percent of the time. Similarly, the least successful 
players from Period 1 often keep performing poorly: the worst percentile stay in that category 10.2 
percent of the time, and belong to the worst decile in 32.0 percent of the cases. They rarely 
outperform: the best decile is reached only 2.7 percent of the time. 
[ Please insert Table 4 about here ] 
 
III. Regression Analyses 
To further analyze the role of skill we regress performance over the final six months of our sample on 
performance over the first six months, and on other measures that may serve as skill proxies. We 
consider the following explanatory variables: 
- SPM: the standard performance measure Žƌ  “ǁŝŶ ƌĂƚĞ ?, defined as the average number of 
big blinds won per hundred hands after correction for rake. 
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2
22
2
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~  , where ni,t is the number of hands 
played by player i in period t, and si,t is the standard deviation of big blinds won by player i in period t. This 
approach avoids the use of an unreliable standard deviation estimate for players who participated in a 
relatively small number of hands during Period 2, and assumes that ʍi is stable through time. In the extreme 
case where ni,2 A? 2 we set 12 ,i,i ss~  . 
[12] 
- PRM: the performance robustness measure, defined as the average number of big blinds 
won per hand after correction for rake divided by the estimated standard error. The 
estimated standard error is the sample standard deviation of the rake-corrected winnings 
per hand divided by the square root of the number of hands. 
- Hands (log): the natural logarithm of the number of hands played. This variable is a proxy for 
the experience of players and thus a possible indicator of skill. 
- Tightness: one minus the proportion of hands in which a player voluntarily wagered money 
ŝŶƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚďĞƚƚŝŶŐƌŽƵŶĚ ? “ĐĂůůĞĚŽƌƌĂŝƐĞĚďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞĨůŽƉ ? ? ?The degree of tightness is one of 
the two simple measures that are typically used to broadly categorize players ? playing styles. 
Generally, tighter play is thought to be indicative of a better player. Common mistakes in 
poker are to impatiently look for  “action ? and to overestimate the profitability of playing a 
given hand. 
- Aggressiveness: the number of times Ă ƉůĂǇĞƌ ůĞĚ ƚŚĞ ďĞƚƚŝŶŐ  ? “ďĞƚ ? Žƌ  “ƌĂŝƐĞĚ ? ? ĂƐ Ă
ƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƚŽƚĂů ŶƵŵďĞƌ ŽĨ ƚŝŵĞƐ ƚŚĞ ƉůĂǇĞƌ ǀŽůƵŶƚĂƌŝůǇ ǁĂŐĞƌĞĚ ŵŽŶĞǇ  ? “ďĞƚ ? ?
 “ĐĂůůĞĚ ?or  “ƌĂŝƐĞĚ ? ? ? dŚŝƐ factor is the other of the two simple playing style measures. 
Aggressive play is generally thought to yield a higher expected performance than passive 
play, because increasing the cost of playing at the right times can pressure other players to 
give up stronger cards or to wager more with weaker ones. 
- Tournaments: a ƉůĂǇĞƌ ?Ɛ ƚŽƵƌŶĂŵĞŶƚĂďŝůŝƚǇrating according to SharkScope, a website that 
tracks virtually all online poker tournament results. The worst possible rating is 50 and the 
best possible rating is 100. The exact calculation is not disclosed by SharkScope. Tournament 
performance is a possible indicator of skill, because of the many similarities between 
tournament and cash game play. 
The last three variables are standardized such that they have a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of one. To avoid endogeneity issues, all six explanatory variables are solely based on data 
from before Period 2: the first five cover the prior six months (Period 1), and the tournament ability 
rating is determined over the prior twelve months. The tournament ability rating was available for 79 
percent of the players who played 1,000 or more ring game hands in Period 1. 
We run two sets of regressions, one for the standard performance measure and the other for our 
performance robustness measure. In the former case, we face the issue of heteroskedasticity: the 
variance of the error term is proportional to the sample variance of the number of big blinds won 
( 2is ) and inversely proportional to the number of hands played (ni) in Period 2. We therefore apply 
[13] 
weighted least squares (WLS) to estimate these regression models, where the weighing factor is the 
inverse of the variance of the error term ( 2ii s/n ). When our performance robustness measure is the 
dependent variable we use ordinary least squares (OLS), because the errors there have constant 
variance by construction. 
Panel A of Table 5 presents the WLS results for the standard performance measure. In each 
univariate regression, performance is significantly related to the skill proxy from the previous period 
(all p < 0.001). Not only the historical performance measure (Model 1), but also the number of hands 
played (Model 2), the two style measures (Models 3 and 4) and the tournament ability variable 
(Model 5) predict performance to a modest but statistically significant extent. Players who 
participated in more hands in the previous period perform better, as do players who adopted a tight 
or aggressive playing style and players who did well in tournaments. Combined, the measures explain 
3.3 percent of the variance in performance (Model 6). The smaller-than-unity coefficient in Model 1 
indicates ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐƌĞŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŝŶƉůĂǇĞƌƐ ?ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞŽǀĞƌƚŝŵĞ. 
We obtain qualitatively similar results when we use our performance robustness measure (Panel B), 
but the explanatory power is higher now. The percentage of variance explained by the joint skill 
proxies is 8.1 percent, which is about 2.5 times as high as the empirical fit of the previous 
multivariate specification. We have also performed the regression analyses for the three stakes levels 
separately. The results and conclusions are all similar to the results for the aggregate sample. 
[ Please insert Table 5 about here ] 
Although these results reinforce our earlier findings of performance persistence and the role of skill 
in poker, the major part of variance in performance remains unexplained by the models and appears 
to be attributable to chance. An issue that we have not yet explicitly addressed so far is the problem 
of errors in variables. /ŶƚŚĞŝĚĞĂůƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶǁĞǁŽƵůĚŬŶŽǁĞǀĞƌǇƉůĂǇĞƌ ?ƐƉƌĞĐŝƐĞƐŬŝůůůĞǀĞů ?ďƵƚŐŝǀĞŶ
the lack of this information we have to use noisy proxies. When explanatory variables are 
mismeasured, coefficients estimated via standard regression methods are biased towards zero and 
the true explanatory power is underestimated. The low empirical fit of the regression models 
indicates that measurement error is a serious issue for the historical performance measures: if a 
random factor explains much of the variation in performance, any measurement of previous 
performance is likely to be subject to a large degree of randomness as well.7 
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 The playing style variables are measured with relatively little error because they are based on a large number 
of draws from a binomial distribution. Their relatively poor predictive power appears to be especially related to 
their more indirect reflection of skill. 
[14] 
The bias of an estimated coefficient towards zero as a consequence of measurement error is known 
as attenuation or regression dilution. Although measurement error is not a problem for predictive 
modeling, it can give an unjust impression of the size of the effect of skill on performance here and 
may falsely suggest that ĂƉůĂǇĞƌ ?Ɛskill is not a stable quality over time. To account for error in both 
the dependent and the independent variable we therefore also run a so-called Deming regression 
(methodological details are in the appendix). The results indicate that the standard regression 
understates the size of the effect of skill on performance to a considerable extent: when we regress 
the win rate from Period 2 on the win rate from Period 1, we obtain a coefficient of 1.392 (p < 0.001). 
When the performance robustness measure is used for the dependent and for the independent 
variable, the coefficient is 1.156 (p < 0.001). These alternative coefficients are not only substantially 
higher and closer to unity than the values of 0.167 and 0.229 reported before, but also significantly 
greater than unity (p < 0.001). Taken at face value, this suggests that the disparity in performance 
between players increases over time. Our robustness analysis at the end of this section, however, 
indicates that the two coefficients are somewhat inflated as a consequence of ƉůĂǇĞƌƐ ?budget 
constraints. 
The underestimation of the true explanatory power of skill as a consequence of measurement error 
decreases with the number of hands used to calculate the proxy for skill. With more observations, 
measurement error becomes relatively less important: the ratio of the variance of the measurement 
error and the variance of the true explanatory variable decreases with the number of hands. This 
holds for each of our two historical performance measures. For the standard performance measure 
the variance of the measurement error decreases as the number of hands increases. For the 
performance robustness measure the variance of the measurement error is constant (at unity), but 
for this measure an increase in the number of hands leads to more distinctive differences between 
players with a different expected win rate, reducing the relative size of measurement errors. 
To illustrate the effect of the number of observations per player on the empirical fit, we run 
ƌĞŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶƐĨŽƌƚŚĞƉŽŽůĞĚƌĞƐƵůƚƐŽĨ “ƚĞĂŵƐ ?ŽĨƉůĂǇĞƌƐ ?DŽƌĞƉƌĞcisely, we first rank players on the 
basis of their performance in Period 1. We then group the players into percentiles, where the best 
one percent of players form a group, the second-best one percent form another group, et cetera. 
Next, for each percentile we calculate Period 1 and Period 2 performance across all hands of the 
players in the group combined. Last, we regress the pooled Period 2 performance on the pooled 
Period 1 performance. The average hypothetical  “player ? has now played about 2.1 million hands in 
Period 1 (instead of 7,038) and 1.0 million in Period 2 (instead of 4,814). The results are remarkable. 
When performance is expressed as the win rate the R2 is 66.7 percent, and when the performance 
robustness measure is used the R2 is 80.1 percent. 
[15] 
We conclude this section with a robustness analysis. To make sure that the documented persistence 
of performance truly reflects the role of skill, we need to verify that the results are not driven by 
differences in budget constraints between players. As already explained in Section II, a budget 
constraint can force a player to stop playing when losses accumulate, and, consequently, a negative 
performance is less likely to be cancelled out or diluted by subsequent hands than a positive 
performance. The stronger ĂƉůĂǇĞƌ ?Ɛbudget constraint at the start of a given period, the greater the 
likelihood that she needs to stop early after losses, and the lower her expected SPM and PRM over 
this period. Differences in budget constraints across players can be both exogenously and 
endogenously determined: some players may simply have smaller fixed budgets for playing than 
others in each period, and players who have lost in a previous period have less funds available in 
their accounts than players who have won. In both cases, the contemporaneous relation between 
the strength of a budget constraint and performance can ůĞĂĚ ƚŽ ƐƉƵƌŝŽƵƐ ĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ƉůĂǇĞƌƐ ? 
performance through time. 
To avoid the possible influence of budget constraints, we use hand samples of a fixed size for every 
player. For n = 1,000, 5,000 and 10,000, we select all players who have played at least 2n hands over 
our entire sample period, and test whether performance over the first n hands is predictive of 
performance over the following n hands. 
The regression results are in Table 6, and point out that the persistence of performance is robust to 
this alternative specification. Regardless of n and regardless of which of the two performance 
measures is being used, performance over the second n hands is significantly related to performance 
over the first n hands (all p < 0.001). 
Note that there are also two downsides to this alternative approach. First, there is more 
measurement error because in many cases fewer hands are being used to proxy for skill (especially 
when n = 1,000). Raising n solves this issue, but comes at the cost of the inclusion of fewer players. 
Second, if losing players play less (because of budget constraints or a lost appetite to play), the 
selection criteria lead to a more homogeneous set of players in terms of their performance. Together 
with the exclusion of a possible spurious effect of budget constraints, these effects may explain why 
the R2 values for the two present Model 1 specifications (0.5% for SPM and 0.6% for PRM) are 
remarkably lower than before (2.2% and 4.9%, respectively; see Table 5). Increased measurement 
error also explains why the regression coefficients are smaller than before.8 
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 Note that the R
2
 values for the different fixed numbers of hands suggest that decreasing measurement errors 
are more important than increasing homogeneity when n increases from 1,000 to 5,000, and that the two 
effects are limited or (more or less) cancel out with a further increase to 10,000. Furthermore, the larger 
[16] 
To account for measurement error we also estimate the six univariate models for the same fixed-size 
hand samples using Deming regression. Interestingly, all six resulting coefficients are qualitatively 
close to unity (between 0.86 and 1.11) and only two are statistically significantly different from unity. 
This result suggests that the Deming coefficients found before were larger than unity due to a 
spurious effect from budget constraints that is now eliminated, and, more importantly, it points out 
that skill differences between poker players are close to constant over time. 
[ Please insert Table 6 about here ] 
 
IV. Simulations 
The previous analyses demonstrate that there is persistence in the performance of poker players. 
Based on the results, we can confidently rule out that we are dealing with a game of pure chance. 
Skill is a factor of importance, but the key question left unanswered is whether skill also dominates 
chance, that is, whether poker is more a game of skill than a game of chance. The answer to this 
question critically depends on the ŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨŚĂŶĚƐ “ƚŚĞŐĂŵĞŽĨƉŽŬĞƌ ?ŝƐƐƵƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽconstitute. 
The role of chance diminishes with the number of hands, and the law of large numbers implies that it 
eventually cancels out when the number of hands grows large enough. 
In the present section we use simulations to approximate the number of hands above which skill 
predominates. More specifically, in accordance with the decile analyses, we first rank all players who 
have played 1,000 hands or more over the first six months of our sample period according to their 
performance during that first subperiod. Next, for the best performers, we randomly draw (with 
replacement) a given number of h hands from their combined sample of hands recorded for the 
second six months, and we compute their total winnings (in big blinds) across these h hands.9 We do 
the same for the worst performers, and then compare the total winnings of the two player 
categories. For each different value of h, we repeat this procedure 25,000 times and determine the 
proportion of times that the supposedly more skilled players do better than their supposedly less 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
regression coefficients for n = 5,000 than for n = 1,000 again underline the nature and role of measurement 
error, and the larger constants for larger n confirm the selection effect that occurs here. 
9
 To circumvent technical limitations, we draw from a representative subset of one million hands when the 
actual sample size is greater than one million. We have verified that the results are insensitive to this 
approximation. 
[17] 
skilled counterparts. A similar approach was used by Randal D. Heeb in his expert report for a U.S. 
Federal court case in New York in 2012.10 
Skill predominates in this comparison when the proportion is greater than 0.75. This threshold 
follows from a simple model where we define the skill factor, ʋh, as the probability that skill 
determines the more profitable player across h different hands. Accordingly, 1 - ʋh is the chance 
factor, or the probability that chance determines the more profitable player. When skill alone 
determines the winner (ʋh = 1), the more skilled player always wins; when chance alone determines 
the winner (ʋh = 0), the more skilled player wins half the time. More generally, the overall probability 
that the more skilled player is ahead after h hands is equal to ph = ʋh · 1 + (1 - ʋh) · 0.5. Skill 
predominates when ʋh > 0.5, implying ph > 0.75. 
The accuracy of our simulation approach depends on the formation of two distinct groups of players. 
With each draw of hands, we want to simulate and compare the winnings of a relatively skilled and a 
relatively unskilled player. Every time, the former is thus assumed to be the better player, with a 
higher expected performance than the latter. Because we cannot observe a ƉůĂǇĞƌ ?Ɛ ƚƌƵĞ ƐŬŝůů and 
need to rely on an imperfect proxy, we cannot exclude that our simulations sometimes confuse the 
two types. To limit this risk, we draw from the hands of players who ended up in either the very best 
or the very worst performance percentile of the first six months. We use our performance robustness 
measure to rank players, given our earlier evidence that this measure is more accurate than the 
standard performance measure. For the sake of completeness, we also run the simulations with the 
standard performance measure and with the top and bottom deciles of players instead of the top 
and bottom percentiles. 
Figure 1 displays the results. Across a selection of a few hands, the game is hardly different from a 
pure game of chance: the higher-ranked players perform better only slightly more than half the time. 
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 Case 1:11-cr-00414-JBW. For one half of the players in his sample, Heeb estimates a regression model that 
links performance to hundreds of playing style characteristics, including many different variants of Tightness 
and Aggressiveness (see Section III). For the other half, he employs the obtained regression coefficients to 
ĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƉůĂǇĞƌƐ ?ƉƌĞĚŝĐƚĞĚƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ?,ĞĞď ?ƐƐŝŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐƉŽŝŶƚŽƵƚƚŚĂƚƉůĂǇĞƌƐǁŚŽƌĂŶŬŚŝŐŚĂĐĐording to 
this self-constructed skill measure are ahead of lower-ranked players more than 75 percent of the time after 
ŽŶůǇĂĨĞǁŚƵŶĚƌĞĚŚĂŶĚƐ ?ǁĞĂŬŶĞƐƐŽĨ,ĞĞď ?ƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŝ ƚŚĂƚŚĞŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐƉůĂǇĞƌƐ ?ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌ
performance over the same set of hands. This is likely to lead to spurious correlation between skill and 
performance scores, because both scores are contemporaneously co-determined by the same chance 
elements. For example, players who are dealt a greater fraction of strong hands or hands that connect well 
with the community cards are more likely to score high on the dimension of aggressiveness (and thus relatively 
high on skill) and to record a strong performance. Consequently, his analysis is likely to produce an 
underestimation of the critical number of hands above which skill predominates. 
[18] 
The proportion steeply increases with the number of hands, at a decreasing marginal rate.11 As 
indicated by the solid black line, the critical point where the best percentile of players (according to 
the performance robustness measure) is ahead 75 percent of the times is reached after 1,471 hands. 
As expected, this number is larger when the best and worst percentiles are being selected on the 
basis of the standard performance measure (2,139), and even larger when deciles instead of 
percentiles are being used (6,512 and 7,293 for PRM and SPM, respectively). 
[ Please insert Figure 1 about here ] 
Figure 2 zooms in on the simulation results for h = 10, 100, 1,000 and 10,000, and shows histograms 
for the distribution of the difference in win rate (number of big blinds won per hundred hands) 
between the two groups. While the previous figure only shows the proportion of times this 
difference is positive at a given h, the histograms also show the magnitude of the difference in 
profitability between the higher-ranked and lower-ranked players. Upon visual inspection, the 
distribution is widely but symmetrically distributed around zero when h = 10. The distribution 
gradually becomes more centered around its mean when h increases, and, consequently, with a 
greater h the positive mean win-rate difference of 21.2 bb/100 becomes more apparent (note the 
different scales for the horizontal axes). At h = 10, 100, 1,000 and 10,000, the fractions where the 
higher-ranked players are behind amount to 47, 43, 29 and 4 percent, respectively. Their chances of 
underperforming by more than 10 bb/100 shrink from 44 to 39, 21 and 0.5 percent, respectively. At 
the critical number of approximately 1,500 hands where skill dominates chance, the frequency of 
underperformance by more than 10 bb/100 amounts to 16 percent. 
[ Please insert Figure 2 about here ] 
 
V. Discussion and Conclusions 
Our study shows that there is a significant skill factor in online ring game poker, and that this factor 
dominates the luck factor after a moderate duration of play. In Section II and Section III we have 
examined whether possible skill differences between online poker players explain differences in their 
performance. The results in these sections provide strong evidence against the hypothesis that poker 
is a game of pure chance. For a game of pure chance there would be no correlation in the winnings of 
players across successive time intervals. 
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 In fact, as h increases, the empirical win proportion converges to the win proportion that would result from 
performance being normally distributed (just as the central limit theorem predicts). 
[19] 
The decile analyses demonstrate that players who rank higher (lower) in profitability over the 
previous six months generally continue to perform better (worse) than others during the present six 
months. For example, players from the best decile earn about 20 to 25 big blinds per 100 hands more 
during the subsequent six months than players from the worst decile. In line with diminishing returns 
to skill the differences between consecutive deciles are greatest for the ninth and tenth decile. When 
we rank players on the basis of how well they did according to our alternative performance 
robustness measure, we find that top ten percent players rank among the top ten percent of the 
next six months approximately twice as often as others, and among the worst ten percent 
approximately half as often. The results are even more pronounced if we look at the best one 
percent. Similarly, those who perform the worst hardly ever end up in the top category. 
Our regression results reinforce these findings, and show that current performance is not only 
related to historical performance but also in some extent to simple measures of playing style. Players 
who are characterized by a tight or aggressive style generally perform better than their loose or 
passive opponents. Performance is also related to the number of hands that players have played over 
the previous period: more frequent or experienced players achieve better results. This finding can 
indicate that better players choose to play more and that players learn from playing. Both 
interpretations conflict with the pure-chance hypothesis. 
Given these results we believe that we can legitimately conclude that skill is an important factor in 
online ring game poker. However, most jurisdictions do not ask whether a game involves an 
important degree of skill, but, more specifically, whether skill predominates. At the same time, no 
legislator seems to prescribe how this should be tested. The key complication is that the extent to 
which skill differences explain differences in performance depends on the number of hands over 
which performance is measured. If sufficiently many hands are played, skill explains practically all 
variation in performance. This is nicely illustrated by the high explanatory power of our regressions 
with the pooled performance scores of percentiles of players, and by the decile analyses, where the 
(rank) correlation between the past and the current performance of large groups is near-perfect or 
even perfect. A definite answer to the predominance question thus calls for a definition of the 
relevant measurement interval. The possible extremes are a single hand and ĂƉůĂǇĞƌ ?ƐůŝĨĞƚŝŵĞ, and 
intermediate options include an average session, a month, and a (fiscal or calendar) year. 
Instead of predetermining one particular interval ourselves, we have employed simulations to 
estimate the number of hands where skill and chance are equally important. In Section IV, we 
basically run horse races of different durations between a relatively skilled player and a relatively 
unskilled player who are playing independently from each other. These simulations point out that 
skill dominates chance when performance is measured over 1,500 or more hands of play. To put this 
[20] 
number into perspective: at a rate of 60-80 hands per hour per table, playing 1,500 hands takes 
people who play only one table at a time about 19 to 25 hours (four to six evenings) of play. 
Participating on multiple tables simultaneously  W which is what many experienced players do  W 
effectively reduces this duration to one or two sessions. 
As with any empirical estimate, the exact outcome depends on the specific approach. Our estimate 
that skill predominates after 1,500 hands should be seen in this light. The simulations do for example 
not account for possible serial dependence in hand results, which may have led to an 
underestimation of the critical number of hands. However, we believe that we have taken a 
conservative approach, because the two types of players in our simulations were not playing the 
game against each other, and because of selection effects. 
With few exceptions, the series of hand outcomes that we compare consist of hands that have been 
played at tables where the relatively skilled and the relatively unskilled players (virtually) sat down 
with other players than their counterparts in our comparison. The hands were played at different 
tables and at different moments in time. We are thus not analyzing how well a selection of strong 
players fare against a selection of weak ones, but comparing how well they did against a cross-
section of others, including players from their own category. Would higher-ability players be directly 
playing against lower-ability players, skill should be expected to predominate substantially quicker. 
To avoid extremely noisy historical skill estimates, we have required a minimum data history per 
player. Unintentionally, this approach is likely to have generated a selection effect: because intensity 
of play and experience are (almost tautologically) related, relatively inexperienced players are 
underrepresented in our analyses. Every player in our final sample will normally be well informed 
about the rules of the game and master some basic strategic concepts. The emphasis on relatively 
skilled players in our data is probably stronger towards the end of our sample period, because 
relatively poor players are more likely to lose and quit early, and if they continue to play they have 
more potential to learn from experience and improve their game. If we would also observe complete 
beginners playing the game, the differences in performance across players would presumably be 
greater, and the critical number of hands where skill starts to predominate would consequently be 
more quickly reached. 
The relative homogeneity of our sample is probably strengthened by players ? self-selection into 
stakes levels on the basis of their perception of their skill level. Better players are more likely to play 
for larger stakes, while worse or beginning players may feel more comfortable at smaller stakes. This 
self-selection into the game is not unique for poker. In many games, people play against opponents 
of relatively similar ability. When such self-selection occurs, the influence of randomness on the 
[21] 
outcome of a contest increases, and it will take a longer series of events before skill differences 
materialize  W even with professional sports and with games like chess and bridge. 
We conclude with a brief discussion of the generalizability of our findings. Our study has been limited 
to online play. Due to a lack of readily available data, it is practically impossible to execute an 
analogous, large-scale analysis for offline play. Nevertheless, given that skill is important in the online 
variant, we conjecture that it is likely to be even more important for brick-and-mortar play. One 
reason is that offline play also involves body language and other subtle forms of communication. 
Players are sitting face-to-face and need to carefully control their behavior to not reveal the strength 
of their cards ?ĂŶĚďǇŽďƐĞƌǀŝŶŐŽƚŚĞƌƐƚŚĞǇĐĂŶƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌƵƐĞĨƵů “ƚĞůůƐ ?ĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞŝƌƉůĂǇ ? At 
the same time, body language can also be used to deliberately mislead opponents. Furthermore, 
ƉůĂǇĞƌƐ ?patience is put to the test more in live play than in online play because fewer hands are dealt 
per hour. In live poker, skill will probably dominate chance at fewer hands, but because of the slower 
pace of play and the impossibility to play on multiple tables it may take more hours to reach the 
critical number. 
Another limitation is that we have looked at cash game play only, while both online and offline poker 
are also frequently played in tournament form. This focus was deliberate, because the value of a 
given amount of chips wagered in a tournament hand depends on the phase of the tournament and 
on ƉůĂǇĞƌƐ ? ĐŚŝƉ ƐƚĂĐŬ ƐŝǌĞ ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞ ƚŽthe chip stacks of their opponents. This issue greatly 
complicates the analysis of performance using hand-level data. A more straightforward approach for 
tournaments would be to analyze ƉůĂǇĞƌƐ ?finishes, which is precisely what Croson, Fishman and 
Pope (2008) and Levitt and Miles (2014) do for major live events. It is hard to tell whether 
tournament poker requires more or less skill than the cash game variant, but we believe that a 
substantial difference is not very likely. In the early phases, tournaments are very similar to cash 
games, and so will be the roles of chance and skill. At later stages, chance increases in importance 
because the blind bets become larger ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞƚŽƉůĂǇĞƌƐ ?ĐŚŝƉƐƚĂĐŬƐ, which effectively reduces the 
opportunities for strategic betting. However, for the same reason, meticulous hand selection (which 
dealt hands to play and which not) then becomes even more consequential. Furthermore, especially 
at later stages, players also need to factor in the prize money structure in their decisions. Future 
work could exploit the large amount of available tournament data and see if our speculation that skill 
similarly predominates after a few sessions of play indeed holds true. 
[22] 
Appendix: Deming Regression 
Deming regression was first introduced by Adcock (1878). Kummell (1879) extended the method by 
allowing for the errors in the dependent and in the independent variable to have different variances 
(although the former was still assumed to be proportional to the latter for all observations). The 
method is named after the statistician W. Edwards Deming who propagated it (Deming, 1943). For 
our regression, we use the following model: 
(A1) *1,
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where *,tiy  are the true values and tiy ,  are the observed values for the performance of player i in 
period t (t = 1,2) and where Hi,t is the measurement error that is normally distributed with a mean of 
zero. 
While standard regression approaches minimize the sum of squares of residuals for the dependent 
variable (ei,2) only, we here minimize the sum of squares of the standardized residuals for both the 
dependent and the independent variable: 
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This leads to the following objective function: 
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As show in York (1966), the solution is: 
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In most applications, the variance of the measurement error is not known at the level of individual 
observations. In order to solve the optimization problem it is then usually assumed that the ratio 
   1,2, varvar ii HH  is the same for all i. We are in the unique situation that we do have accurate 
estimates, which allows us to obtain unbiased estimates of M  and D . When the performance of 
poker players is measured as the average number of big blinds won, the variance of the 
measurement error var(Hi,t) for any specific observation is approximated by titi ns ,2, , or the ratio of 
the underlying sample variance of the number of big blinds won ( 2,tis ) and the number of hands (ni,t). 
When our performance robustness measure is used, the measurement error variance is always equal 
to unity. 
[24] 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
The table shows descriptive statistics for our full sample of 456 million player-hand observations from real 
money ring games EŽ>ŝŵŝƚdĞǆĂƐ,ŽůĚ ?Ğŵat three different stakes levels. For each stakes level and for the 
three levels combined, the first two rows show the number of players and the number of hands at the 
aggregate level. The other rows provide player-level statistics on the number of hands played, the total 
winnings expressed as the number of big blinds won, and the average number of big blinds won per hundred 
hands. Profitability statistics are shown with and without correction for rake (the commission taken by the 
operator). Winnings are corrected for rake by adding back rake in proportion to ƉůĂǇĞƌƐ ?contribution to the 
pot. The small, medium and high stakes games have big blinds of $0.25, $2 and $10, respectively. 
 
      
  
Small 
stakes 
Medium 
stakes 
High 
stakes 
All 
stakes 
      
Total players  457,063 230,098 33,572 611,484 
Total hands (in millions)  190.6 229.1 36.4 456.1 
Hands 
Mean 417 996 1,085 746 
Minimum 1 1 1 1 
Median 52 82 70 71 
Maximum 341,498 763,791 461,743 764,890 
Stdev 2,648 8,261 7,003 5,909 
Big blinds won 
(raked) 
Mean -39 -51 -20 -49 
Minimum -13,134 -10,461 -6,886 -13,135 
Median -19 -29 -21 -25 
Maximum 11,641 26,516 31,348 30,501 
Stdev 203 374 405 307 
Big blinds won 
(not raked) 
Mean 0 0 0 0 
Minimum -8,748 -7,605 -6,438 -8,749 
Median -9 -21 -19 -15 
Maximum 26,209 44,110 38,631 44,832 
Stdev 255 573 467 433 
Big blinds won per 100 hands 
(raked) 
Mean -99 -104 -106 -104 
Minimum -21,500 -15,740 -12,673 -20,000 
Median -28 -31 -24 -30 
Maximum 11,200 15,000 10,030 15,000 
Stdev 494 455 588 461 
Big blinds won per 100 hands 
(not raked) 
Mean -83 -95 -103 -88 
Minimum -21,000 -15,666 -12,670 -19,400 
Median -16 -24 -22 -20 
Maximum 11,600 15,000 10,040 15,000 
Stdev 474 451 587 448 
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Table 2: Standard Performance Measure Deciles 
The table ranks all players who played 1,000 hands or more over the first six months of our sample period 
(Period 1) into deciles by their performance over these six months, where performance is measured as the 
average number of big blinds won per hundred hands after correction for rake. For each decile, the first 
columns show the number of included players (N) and their average performance (bb/100) for this ranking 
period. The next columns show the number of players from the decile who played at least one hand in the last 
six months of our sample period (Period 2), as well as their average performance for this measurement period 
and how they rank on average relative to all other players who played at least one hand (Rank). Average decile 
performance (bb/100) is expressed both as a straight average (unweighted) and as a weighted average, where 
ƚŚĞǁĞŝŐŚƚƐĂƌĞĞŝƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĞƐƋƵĂƌĞƌŽŽƚƐŽĨƉůĂǇĞƌƐ ?ŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨŚĂŶĚƐ  ?weighted by n) ŽƌƉůĂǇĞƌƐ ?ŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨ 
hands (weighted by n). Panel A (B/C) shows the results for observations from the small (medium/high) stakes 
level separately. Panel D shows the results for all stakes levels combined. For each panel, the table shows the 
Spearman rank correlation between the two periods for the average performance at the decile level (for each 
weighting method) and for performance at the player level (in Rank column). 
 
 Period 1 Period 2 
   bb/100    bb/100   
Decile N 
un-
weighted 
weighted 
by n 
weighted 
by n 
N 
un-
weighted 
weighted 
by n 
weighted 
by n 
Rank 
Panel A: Small stakes 
1 1,726 36.6 35.8 34.7 826 -12.9 3.5 6.8 4,034 
2 1,725 19.7 19.6 19.5 862 -12.4 4.7 7.5 3,985 
3 1,726 13.5 13.5 13.4 866 1.4 5.2 6.7 3,895 
4 1,726 9.2 9.2 9.2 842 -2.4 4.7 6.5 3,956 
5 1,726 5.9 5.9 5.9 837 -2.3 4.8 6.4 3,925 
6 1,725 3.0 3.0 3.0 775 -8.3 3.4 4.9 4,068 
7 1,726 -0.1 0.0 0.0 759 -7.5 3.3 5.1 4,141 
8 1,726 -4.0 -3.9 -3.8 771 -11.1 1.4 3.8 4,181 
9 1,725 -10.2 -10.1 -10.0 790 -26.7 -0.1 4.7 4,320 
10 1,726 -30.0 -29.3 -28.4 890 -20.2 -7.5 -1.3 4,587 
Correlation 0.370 0.818 0.964 0.074 
(p-value) (0.296) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) 
Panel B: Medium stakes 
1 1,644 34.0 33.0 31.6 946 -25.6 -3.5 3.8 4,398 
2 1,643 16.0 15.7 15.3 983 -14.7 0.9 6.0 4,229 
3 1,644 9.8 9.7 9.6 937 -22.0 1.6 5.9 4,253 
4 1,643 6.0 6.0 5.9 923 -14.2 3.0 5.3 3,972 
5 1,644 3.0 3.0 3.1 894 -10.2 0.9 3.8 4,132 
6 1,643 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 833 -36.2 -2.9 2.3 4,485 
7 1,644 -4.4 -4.3 -4.2 821 -18.8 -4.2 1.8 4,627 
8 1,643 -9.7 -9.6 -9.5 831 -29.6 -5.8 1.4 4,673 
9 1,644 -18.2 -18.2 -18.0 862 -40.5 -10.3 -2.7 4,806 
10 1,643 -41.6 -40.8 -39.9 905 -48.8 -18.0 -5.2 5,190 
Correlation 0.612 0.733 0.927 0.104 
(p-value) (0.066) (0.021) (0.000) (0.000) 
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Table 2 (continued) 
 
 Period 1 Period 2 
   bb/100    bb/100   
Decile N 
un-
weighted 
weighted 
by n 
weighted 
by n 
N 
un-
weighted 
weighted 
by n 
weighted 
by n 
Rank 
Panel C: High stakes 
1 273 36.8 35.7 33.9 177 -4.7 3.5 5.8 783 
2 272 16.3 16.1 15.8 171 -12.7 -0.8 2.6 862 
3 273 9.7 9.6 9.5 181 4.3 2.8 2.9 797 
4 272 5.8 5.8 5.8 191 -0.3 2.2 3.9 793 
5 273 2.8 2.8 2.8 182 -3.8 2.1 4.1 817 
6 272 -0.1 0.0 0.2 179 -17.0 0.6 3.5 887 
7 273 -4.0 -3.9 -3.7 159 -5.6 -1.9 -1.1 832 
8 272 -9.1 -9.0 -8.8 148 -7.6 -4.0 -0.8 891 
9 273 -16.5 -16.4 -16.1 158 -32.1 -9.5 -4.1 950 
10 272 -40.2 -39.2 -38.0 150 -21.5 -9.6 -1.9 906 
Correlation 0.636 0.879 0.770 0.088 
(p-value) (0.054) (0.002) (0.014) (0.000) 
Panel D: All stakes 
1 3,657 34.7 33.8 32.7 2,082 -23.0 -0.2 5.1 10,135 
2 3,657 17.5 17.4 17.2 2,126 -13.1 2.2 6.1 9,810 
3 3,657 11.3 11.3 11.1 2,140 -12.6 2.7 6.0 9,736 
4 3,657 7.3 7.2 7.1 2,105 -6.0 3.8 5.9 9,442 
5 3,657 4.1 4.1 4.1 2,099 -13.7 2.3 4.5 9,850 
6 3,657 1.1 1.1 1.2 2,004 -13.3 1.3 3.7 9,907 
7 3,657 -2.5 -2.5 -2.4 1,939 -16.0 -1.0 3.0 10,382 
8 3,657 -7.4 -7.3 -7.3 1,948 -22.0 -3.5 1.7 10,764 
9 3,657 -14.9 -14.8 -14.7 2,047 -25.7 -6.0 0.0 11,062 
10 3,657 -37.7 -37.0 -36.1 2,142 -42.5 -16.5 -5.9 12,098 
Correlation 0.600 0.733 0.927 0.101 
(p-value) (0.073) (0.021) (0.000) (0.000) 
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Table 3: Performance Robustness Measure Deciles 
The table ranks all players who played 1,000 hands or more over the first six months of our sample period into 
deciles by their performance over these six months. Here, the performance measure that is used to rank 
players is the performance robustness measure, which is defined as the average number of big blinds won per 
hand after correction for rake divided by the estimated standard error. The estimated standard error is the 
sample standard deviation of the rake-corrected winnings per hand divided by the square root of the number 
of hands. The statistics shown for each resulting decile are defined as in Table 2. The various panels and 
correlation coefficients are also identically defined. 
 
 Period 1 Period 2 
   bb/100    bb/100   
Decile N 
un-
weighted 
weighted 
by n 
weighted 
by n 
N 
un-
weighted 
weighted 
by n 
weighted 
by n 
Rank 
Panel A: Small stakes 
1 1,726 26.9 21.1 16.0 908 -1.3 6.2 7.4 3,777 
2 1,725 21.0 17.4 13.9 822 1.4 6.1 6.8 3,843 
3 1,726 16.1 13.5 10.7 856 -6.0 3.9 5.5 4,008 
4 1,726 11.9 10.1 8.2 822 -10.8 3.0 5.4 4,089 
5 1,726 7.8 6.7 5.5 819 -8.4 3.7 6.0 4,030 
6 1,725 4.1 3.5 2.9 773 -10.9 2.8 5.2 4,094 
7 1,726 -0.1 0.0 0.0 784 -7.9 2.6 5.3 4,180 
8 1,726 -5.0 -4.4 -3.8 794 -19.0 0.6 3.6 4,236 
9 1,725 -11.5 -10.3 -8.8 807 -23.2 0.2 4.6 4,294 
10 1,726 -27.6 -24.9 -21.6 833 -17.3 -6.6 -0.6 4,587 
Correlation 0.867 0.988 0.939 0.091 
(p-value) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Panel B: Medium stakes 
1 1,644 20.9 12.6 8.7 1,084 -6.4 4.7 6.0 3,709 
2 1,643 19.4 13.7 8.9 946 -8.7 2.0 5.2 4,015 
3 1,644 14.4 10.9 7.2 920 -20.5 -0.4 4.3 4,223 
4 1,643 9.5 7.7 5.6 867 -23.8 -4.1 2.4 4,600 
5 1,644 4.4 3.6 2.6 850 -34.7 -4.2 2.5 4,541 
6 1,643 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 856 -32.7 -5.6 1.1 4,602 
7 1,644 -5.6 -4.9 -3.9 827 -26.5 -5.5 2.1 4,670 
8 1,643 -11.6 -10.0 -7.9 873 -40.2 -6.5 1.7 4,741 
9 1,644 -20.2 -17.7 -14.6 836 -29.1 -8.4 -1.0 4,777 
10 1,643 -36.3 -32.1 -26.4 876 -42.6 -14.3 -4.8 5,063 
Correlation 0.855 0.988 0.952 0.148 
(p-value) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Panel C: High stakes 
1 273 24.0 15.1 10.1 204 9.4 4.3 4.1 705 
2 272 20.6 14.7 9.1 176 -0.1 2.1 3.6 807 
3 273 13.5 9.7 5.9 185 -11.5 0.2 2.1 854 
4 272 8.8 6.8 4.6 169 -12.1 -0.6 3.1 863 
5 273 4.3 3.3 2.3 173 -5.8 2.0 5.7 832 
6 272 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 170 -16.4 0.3 2.1 863 
7 273 -5.7 -4.6 -3.6 155 -4.6 -2.6 1.2 868 
8 272 -11.1 -9.1 -6.9 159 -8.6 -4.0 -0.7 865 
9 273 -18.3 -15.1 -11.3 150 -35.9 -6.5 -2.1 920 
10 272 -34.6 -29.1 -22.6 155 -17.9 -10.1 -2.7 959 
Correlation 0.697 0.903 0.867 0.118 
(p-value) (0.031) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
 Period 1 Period 2 
   bb/100    bb/100   
Decile N 
un-
weighted 
weighted 
by n 
weighted 
by n 
N 
un-
weighted 
weighted 
by n 
weighted 
by n 
Rank 
Panel D: All stakes 
1 3,657 23.6 15.6 10.2 2,324 -7.0 5.2 6.2 8,885 
2 3,657 19.8 15.1 10.4 2,112 -5.3 3.4 5.3 9,486 
3 3,657 14.8 11.7 8.4 2,076 -10.7 1.4 4.8 9,966 
4 3,657 10.3 8.4 6.2 2,038 -20.3 0.4 4.4 10,113 
5 3,657 6.0 5.0 3.7 2,006 -21.6 0.0 4.2 10,248 
6 3,657 1.5 1.3 1.0 2,005 -19.5 -1.4 2.9 10,398 
7 3,657 -3.3 -2.8 -2.3 1,970 -23.8 -2.7 2.7 10,654 
8 3,657 -9.0 -7.8 -6.3 2,002 -26.1 -4.5 1.5 10,902 
9 3,657 -16.7 -14.7 -12.1 2,017 -24.2 -5.1 1.2 10,892 
10 3,657 -33.5 -29.8 -24.8 2,082 -31.8 -12.2 -3.9 11,852 
Correlation 0.939 1.000 1.000 0.131 
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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Table 4: Transition Probabilities 
The table shows the transition probabilities across performance deciles for players who played 1,000 hands or 
more over the first six months of our sample period. Each probability indicates the empirical probability of 
transitioning from a given performance decile in the first half-year period (Period 1) to a given performance 
decile in the second half-year period (Period 2). In Panel A, the performance measure that is used to rank 
players in Period 1 and Period 2 is the standard performance measure, where performance is measured as the 
average number of big blinds won per hundred hands after correction for rake (bb/100). In Panel B, the 
performance measure that is used for Period 1 and Period 2 is the performance robustness measure, which is 
defined as the average number of big blinds won per hand after correction for rake divided by its estimated 
standard error. Players for whom we have no observations for Period 2 are not included in the Period 2 
ranking. 
 
Period 1 
decile 
Period 2 decile 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Panel A: Ranking by Standard Performance Measure 
1 0.136 0.116 0.098 0.089 0.063 0.078 0.095 0.094 0.108 0.123 
2 0.108 0.108 0.131 0.097 0.094 0.086 0.099 0.096 0.089 0.091 
3 0.087 0.114 0.124 0.119 0.115 0.099 0.094 0.083 0.079 0.086 
4 0.083 0.103 0.124 0.143 0.140 0.103 0.093 0.090 0.069 0.053 
5 0.076 0.091 0.118 0.133 0.131 0.126 0.099 0.083 0.071 0.072 
6 0.100 0.087 0.093 0.119 0.143 0.119 0.100 0.087 0.079 0.072 
7 0.101 0.093 0.094 0.097 0.099 0.121 0.092 0.109 0.104 0.091 
8 0.094 0.105 0.079 0.079 0.088 0.109 0.118 0.120 0.105 0.103 
9 0.103 0.089 0.081 0.071 0.077 0.097 0.118 0.124 0.130 0.110 
10 0.112 0.092 0.056 0.051 0.051 0.065 0.094 0.116 0.166 0.196 
Panel B: Ranking by Performance Robustness Measure 
1 0.207 0.133 0.118 0.107 0.091 0.078 0.083 0.067 0.060 0.054 
2 0.126 0.117 0.107 0.105 0.108 0.108 0.102 0.091 0.076 0.060 
3 0.101 0.110 0.116 0.104 0.106 0.090 0.095 0.104 0.088 0.086 
4 0.105 0.104 0.110 0.099 0.093 0.099 0.095 0.112 0.094 0.090 
5 0.101 0.090 0.099 0.107 0.104 0.113 0.095 0.100 0.098 0.093 
6 0.087 0.092 0.092 0.103 0.112 0.101 0.105 0.102 0.111 0.095 
7 0.072 0.108 0.091 0.090 0.099 0.107 0.106 0.102 0.121 0.105 
8 0.067 0.089 0.093 0.094 0.106 0.103 0.101 0.111 0.119 0.115 
9 0.063 0.078 0.090 0.104 0.100 0.113 0.114 0.100 0.116 0.122 
10 0.052 0.074 0.080 0.087 0.081 0.091 0.107 0.116 0.125 0.185 
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Table 5: Regression Results 
The table displays the regression results for our subsample of players who played 1,000 hands or more over the 
first six months of our sample period (Period 1) and at least 1 hand over the second six months (Period 2). The 
dependent variable is either the standard performance measure (Panel A) or the performance robustness 
measure (Panel B). The standard performance measure is defined as the average number of big blinds won per 
hundred hands after correction for rake (bb/100). The performance robustness measure is the average number 
of big blinds won after correction for rake divided by its estimated standard error. All explanatory variables are 
calculated using data from Period 1 only. SPM is the ƉůĂǇĞƌ ?Ɛ ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ. PRM is her 
performance robustness measure. Hands (log) is the natural logarithm of the number of hands played. 
Tightness is one minus the proportion of hands in which the player voluntarily wagered money in the first 
betting round. Aggressiveness is the number of times the player led the betting as a proportion of the total 
number of times she voluntarily wagered money. Tournaments is the plaǇĞƌ ?ƐƚŽƵƌŶĂŵĞŶƚĂďŝůŝƚǇƌĂƚŝŶŐ ĨƌŽŵ
the SharkScope database immediately before the start of Period 2. The results reported in Panel A are 
weighted least squares regression results ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƌĂƚŝŽŽĨĂƉůĂǇĞƌ ?Ɛnumber of hands and her sample variance 
of the number of big blinds won in Period 2 as weight. Panel B presents ordinary least squares results. The p-
values are in parentheses. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Panel A: Standard Performance Measure (WLS) 
Constant 3.225 -2.536 2.433 3.435 3.984 -0.057 -1.204 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.930) (0.031) 
SPM 0.167     0.141 0.148 
 (0.000)     (0.000) (0.000) 
Hands (log)  0.687    0.199 0.338 
  (0.000)    (0.004) (0.000) 
Tightness   2.048   1.594 1.368 
   (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
Aggressiveness    1.101  0.668 0.532 
    (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Tournaments     0.412 0.509  
     (0.000) (0.000)  
R
2
 0.022 0.007 0.012 0.007 0.001 0.033 0.035 
N 20,632 20,632 20,632 20,632 16,368 16,368 20,632 
Panel B: Performance Robustness Measure (OLS) 
Constant -0.055 -2.267 0.010 0.010 0.009 -1.289 -1.333 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.269) (0.273) (0.366) (0.000) (0.000) 
PRM 0.229     0.123 0.142 
 (0.000)     (0.000) (0.000) 
Hands (log)  0.281    0.155 0.161 
  (0.000)    (0.000) (0.000) 
Tightness   0.242   0.131 0.125 
   (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
Aggressiveness    0.187  0.080 0.085 
    (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Tournaments     0.078 0.041  
     (0.000) (0.000)  
R
2
 0.049 0.049 0.035 0.021 0.004 0.081 0.086 
N 20,632 20,632 20,632 20,632 16,368 16,368 20,632 
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Table 6: Regression Results for Fixed Numbers of Hands 
The table displays the regression results for subsamples of players who played at least 2n hands during our 
entire sample period, with n = 1,000, 5,000 or 10,000 ?dŚĞĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚǀĂƌŝĂďůĞŝƐƚŚĞƉůĂǇĞƌ ?ƐƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞŽǀĞƌ
the second n hands, as measured by either the standard performance measure (Panel A) or the performance 
robustness measure (Panel B). The explanatory variables are calculated over the first n hands. Other definitions 
are as in Table 5. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 (n1 = n2 = 1,000) (n1 = n2 = 5,000) (n1 = n2 = 10,000) 
Panel A: Standard Performance Measure (WLS) 
Constant 2.348 3.656 3.798 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SPM 0.066 0.142 0.152 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R
2
 0.005 0.021 0.025 
N 31,991 7,340 3,464 
Panel B: Performance Robustness Measure (OLS) 
Constant 0.147 0.465 0.705 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PRM 0.074 0.136 0.125 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R
2
 0.006 0.018 0.016 
N 31,991 7,340 3,464 
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Figure 1: Simulation Results. The figure displays the proportion of times that a selection of h randomly 
drawn hand outcomes for players who were among the best performing players in the past do better than a 
similar-size selection of hand outcomes for players who were among the worst performing players in the past. 
Hand outcomes are randomly drawn from the subsample of hands from the second six months of our sample 
period for players who ranked among the best or worst performing percentiles (black lines) and for players 
who ranked among the best or worst performing deciles (grey lines) over the first six months of our sample 
period. Players are ranked according to the performance robustness measure (solid lines) or the standard 
performance measure (dashed lines). The lines are smoothed, with each point representing the moving 
average proportion across the simulation outcomes available for h-100 up to and including h+100. 
[35] 
 
 
Figure 2: Difference in Win Rate after 10, 100, 1,000 and 10,000 Hands. The histograms A-D display the 
simulated distributions of the difference in win rate (number of big blinds won per hundred hands) between 
players who were in the very best and players who were in the very worst performance percentile of the first 
six months of our sample period. Players are ranked according to the performance robustness measure. For 
each percentile, h hand outcomes are randomly drawn from their subsample of hands from the second six 
months of our sample period. In A, B, C and D, h = 10, 100, 1,000 and 10,000, respectively. 
 
